Introduction
The question of whether it would be better in various circumstances to use quotas or market clearing prices to allocate resources is a debate of long standing.
From time to time it has flared up as a policy issue of genuine importance.
While each specific debate in this series is about a particular issue, and therefore has its own special features, it does seem to me that the same general themes reappear again and again. The purpose of the present paper is to single out and clarify one of the common strands.
A favorite argument for relying on the market to allocate a particular good or service concerns what might be called its built in selectivity.
The price system, it has been said, is really quite a sophisticated mechanism for matching up a scarce commodity with those who need it most.
And this is done automatically, simply by giving consumers a chance to express their preferences in the market place. By contrast, rationing is seen as a crude allocation device which cannot effectively take account of individual differences. Any rationing scheme typically ends up overdelivering goods to some people who don't really want them so much, at the same time that it will be withholding from others with a genuine need for more.
The rejoinder is that using rationing, not the price mechanism, is in fact the better way of ensuring that true needs are met. If a market clearing price is used, this guarantees only that it will get driven up until those with more money end up with more of the deficit commodity.
How can it honestly be said of such a system that it selects out and fulfills real needs when awards are being made as much on the basis of -2-income as anything else? One fair way to make sure that everyone has an equal chance to satisfy his wants would be to give more or less the same share to each consumer independent of his budget size. 
Let f(e) denote the number of consumers of preference type e and let g(X) be the number with marginal utility of income equal to X. Naturally Z f(e) = Z g(X) = n £ X As a norm of sorts, and to make the distinction between their roles especially clear, it will be assumed that tastes and income are independently distributed.
In other words, the number of consumers possessing the trait combination (e,X) is h(e,X) -
n Purely for notational convenience and without loss of generality, e and X are normalized in (1) so that their average values are respectively zero and one:
e can be interpreted from equation (1) as the mean square deviation in the demand for x when income is held constant . This is by contrast with the mean square deviation in the overall demand for x ( without controlling for income) .
The latter variance will be denoted
It should not be difficult for the reader to carry through the analysis when e and X have a non-zero correlation. Formula (18) or (19) will just end up with a covariance term tacked on.
where the symbol 
e A
Using (8), (7) becomes
By (3), (4), (5), this reduces to (12).
-BAp Figure 1 The effectiveness of a plan {x(e 5^)} in meeting true needs for the deficit commodity is defined as the weighted (by the marginal utility of income) average benefit which it yields, E[B(x(e.X);e,X).X] = E z P(x(e,*)?c,*> Xh( £ ,X) .
(n) e X n It seems to me that expression (13) provides a not unreasonable partial equilibrium measure of the ceteris partibus social welfare obtainable from any given distribution of the scarce commodity.
The most effective possible distribution plan (x*(e»X)} would maximize (13) is to give every consumer the same ration x. The effectiveness of rationing in meeting true needs for the deficit commodity is the weighted average benefit which the allocation x( e >^) = x yields 3 More complicated rules than we will consider are certainly possible, for example an entire schedule of prices as a function of the quantity purchased, or even just a two-tiered version. Naturally an optimal schedule can't help but be better than a single price or quantity, which are just special cases of it.
But a schedule is hard to institute and lacks the important quality of simplicity, which the two special cases provide. 4 This is what might be called a pure rationing system. We are abstracting away from prices doing any of the allocating by in effect assuming that the price charged is so low it deters no one from purchasing his allotted quota. E[X.6(x;e,A)] = I E^^^* MM? The effectiveness of the price system in meeting real needs for the deficit commodity is the weighted average benefit it delivers E[X.6(x(p; £ ,X); E ,A)] = Z E X B<*(P?e,A); E ,A) MM) . e A The above expression points up how incomplete, limited, and partial is our treatment of welfare.
In the price allocation system, and this should never be lost from view, revenues of pX are collected by someone or other.
A 
The loss function implicit in the definition of 6 is the difference in the weighted average benefit obtained under the two simple allocation mechanisms.
Setting p = p in (1) and substituting into (12) 
After employing (3), (4), (5), (6), (10), (16), (17) 
As an example, it certainly matters whether the funds are taxed by the government and go to help relieve flood victims or they end up in the bank account of an oil billionaire. Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] develop a general equilibrium taxation framework which sheds light on the nature of the general problem.
This criterion is analogous to the one employed in Weitzman [1974] .
An equivalent but somewhat more useful (because it is more operational) expression for 6 is obtained by substituting from (9) into (18) Here a = a (p) is the mean square deviation in demand for x at its market clearing price p.
Expression (18) or (19) is the fundamental result of this paper. The last section is devoted to examining it in some detail. (6)) minus the uncontrolled variance of demand (7).
Thus, if the mean square deviation of demand by the entire consumer population is not much larger than it is by fixed income subgroup, the price mechanism has greater effectiveness in screening the deficit commodity and funneling more of it to those who need it relatively more. Conversely, the greater the dependence of demand on income (as measured by (19) doesn't make much difference which system is used.
6.
Concluding Remarks
It might be appropriate to end this paper by commenting on its relation to some more standard approaches. Economists sometimes maintain or imply that the market system is a superior mechanism for distributing resources.
After all, the argument goes, consider any other allocation. There is always -some corresponding way of combining the price system with a specific lump sum
Note that a ceteris paribus increase in the market clearing price makes rationing relatively more effective because the income distribution effect takes on added importance. transfer arrangement which will make everyone better off (or at least nô 8 worse)
. This is true enough in principle, but not typically very useful for policy prescriptions because the necessary compensation is practically never paid.
When dispensation jLs made, the point deserves emphasis. For example, by the standard argument of consumer sovereignty, it certainly makes everyone better off if ration tickets can be sold (and bought) than if resale is not allowed. The "white market" is superior to strict rationing because in redistributing property rights, the losers are being adequately compensated or "bought off". However, this does not necessarily mean that pure direct wants for the deficit commodity are better served in the sense that those who "need" it most actually end up receiving more.
Besides, why stop here? Surely the status quo income distribution is non-optimal. An even better system from an overall social welfare position might be to give all the rationing tickets to the infirm (who maybe don't even consume the commodity in question) or to Bangladesh, or so forth.
There is no end to what could be done on the income distribution side. This is one reason why I have preferred to leave in abeyance income considerations and concentrate in this paper on inquiring about the pure distributive effectiveness of an allocation system in getting the deficit commodity to those who need it most. The other and more substantive reason is that I am not sure but that for many situations such a formulation might not be the most appropriate way of posing the question in the first place.
There is a class of commodities whose just distribution is sometimes viewed as a desirable end in itself, independent of how society may be Given the usual general equilibrium assumptions.
See, for example, Arrow and Hahn [1971] .
allocating its other resources.
Such "natural right goods" as basic food and shelter, security, legal aid, military service, medical assistance, education, justice, or even many others are frequently deemed to be sufficiently vital in some sense to give them a special status. 
